Showing posts with label John Rogers Searle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Rogers Searle. Show all posts

Thursday, May 29, 2008

John Rogers Searle


(American philosopher, 1932–). Searle is a prominent and often controversial contributor to philosophy of language and philosophy of mind; he is also noted for the account of social reality he gives in The Construction of Social Reality (1997). Searle's books are written in a clear, conversational style, a factor that contributes to his wide readership among lay-people. His early work was in speech act theory, where he elaborated and contributed new elements to John Austin's work in the field. Searle's philosophy of mind comprises three major components: a critique of computationalism and strong AI (the "Chinese Room Argument"), a theory of intentionality, and a theory of consciousness. Searle believes consciousness to be defined by first-person subjective experience, and thus irreducible to third-person objective description (based on neural states, for example); to attempt such a description is to immediately jettison the subject under consideration (consciousness). Searle also supposes consciousness to be an emergent property of brain processes and a function of brain biology. Searle's books include Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983), The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), The Mystery of Consciousness (1997), Rationality in Action (2001), and Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004).

Monday, May 26, 2008

John Rogers Searle


(American philosopher, 1932–). Searle is a prominent and often controversial contributor to philosophy of language and philosophy of mind; he is also noted for the account of social reality he gives in The Construction of Social Reality (1997). Searle's books are written in a clear, conversational style, a factor that contributes to his wide readership among lay-people. His early work was in speech act theory, where he elaborated and contributed new elements to John Austin's work in the field. Searle's philosophy of mind comprises three major components: a critique of computationalism and strong AI (the "Chinese Room Argument"), a theory of intentionality, and a theory of consciousness. Searle believes consciousness to be defined by first-person subjective experience, and thus irreducible to third-person objective description (based on neural states, for example); to attempt such a description is to immediately jettison the subject under consideration (consciousness). Searle also supposes consciousness to be an emergent property of brain processes and a function of brain biology. Searle's books include Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983), The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), The Mystery of Consciousness (1997), Rationality in Action (2001), and Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004).